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provide the federal share of the cost of developing specific
essential community facilities in rural areas.  Act § 763.
The amount of a grant may not exceed 75 percent of the
cost of developing the facility.  Id.
Rural Electrification Act of 1936. Numerous
amendments are made to the Rural Electrification Act of
1936.  Act § 771.
The legislation specifically prohibits conditioning
assistance under any rural development program on any
requirement that the recipient of the assistance accept or
receive service from any particular utility, supplier or
cooperative.  Act § 778.
Fund for Rural America. An account is established to
be known as the Fund for Rural America.  Act § 793(a).
The account is to be funded with $100,000,000 on January
1, 1997, October 1, 1998 and October 1, 1999.  Act §
793(b).
The Fund may be used for several rural development
activities —
• Authorized under the Housing Act of 1949 for (1)
direct loans to low income borrowers, (2) loans for financial
assistance for domestic farm laborers, (3) financial
assistance for housing for domestic farm laborers, (4)
payments for elderly not now receiving rental assistance, (5)
grants and contracts for mutual and self-help housing, (6)
grants for rural housing preservation; or
• Conducted under any rural development program.  Act
§ 793(c).
The Under Secretary of Agriculture for Rural Economic
and Community Development has been renamed the Under
Secretary of Agriculture for Rural Development.  Act §
794, amending 7 U.S.C. § 6941.
Title VIII — Research, Extension and Education
(This title contains funding guidelines and appropriation
authority for work in research, extension and education.)
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
IRA. In 1991, the debtor rolled over funds from a
terminated pension plan to an IRA. The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 in 1994 and claimed $286,000 in the IRA as
exempt under Mass. Gen. Law, ch 235, § 34. The trustee
objected to the exemption to the extent the rolled-over
amount exceeded 7 percent of the debtor’s total income for
the five years before the bankruptcy filing. The debtor
argued that the 7 percent limit did not apply to rolled-over
funds but only applied to new deposits. The court held that
the statute was unambiguous and limited the IRA
exemption to an amount equal to 7 percent of the debtor’s
income for the five pre-petition years. In re Goldman, 192
B.R. 1 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’g, 182 B.R. 622 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1995).
GRAIN STORAGE FACILITY. The debtor’s
business consisted primarily of purchasing grain for
conditioning and resale as seed, either to third parties or the
producer of the grain. The debtor also sold farm equipment
and various farm inputs. Several creditors sought a fifth
priority under Section 507(a)(5)(A) for their claims against
the debtor as a grain storage facility. The court held that
claims from creditors who purchased, but did not receive,
farm equipment and farm inputs were not entitled to the
priority because the claims did not involve grain or the
proceeds of grain. The court also denied fifth priority to
claims for unpaid wages. The court denied a fifth priority to
claims for the prepayment for seed which was not delivered
to creditors who were not producers of grain but who sold
the seed to third parties. The last group of creditors was
grain producers who sold grain to the debtor and who were
not paid. Some of the grain was processed for seed but
some was resold to third parties to the extent not needed for
the seed inventory. The court held that Section 507(a)(5)(A)
was not intended to apply to situations where grain was sold
to the storage facility with title passing to the facility. The
court assumed that the debtor qualified as a grain storage
facility, although doubted that the debtor qualified as a
grain storage facility. The court held that in order for a
producer to be entitled to the fifth priority, the producer
must have retained title to the grain while the grain was in
the storage facility. In re Mickelson, 192 B.R. 516 (Bank.
D. N.D. 1996).
PLAN. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and one of the
secured claims was held by the FmHA (now the FSA). The
debtor’s plan provided for payment of the claim at 6.5
percent interest. The debtor argued that the FmHA offered 5
percent loans to new farmers and 8 percent loans to
established farmers. The debtor argued that if the FmHA
had been able to foreclose on the debtor’s property, the land
would have been offered to new farmers first at the 5
percent rate and, only if no new farmers were found, would
the 8 percent rate be applied for a loan to purchase the
debtor’s land. Therefore, the debtor proposed a rate halfway
between the two rates as a reasonable compromise. The
Bankruptcy and District Courts held for the debtor;
however, the appellate court reversed, holding that the plan
was to provide a market rate of interest and by definition,
the 5 percent rate was not a market rate of interest but a
subsidized rate. In addition, the debtor was not a new
farmer and could not qualify for the lower rate; therefore,
the lower rate should not have been considered in
determining the market rate of interest to be paid during the
plan. In re Roso, 76 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was divorced in 1984. A
1986 amendment to the property settlement gave the former
spouse a judgment lien against the debtor’s farm real and
personal property to the extent of the unpaid property
settlement. In April 1995, the former spouse obtained a
monetary judgment for the unpaid property settlement and
in May 1995, the debtor filed for Chapter 12. Soon after the
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divorce decree, the debtor quitclaimed the farm homestead
of 480 acres back to the debtor’s parents from whom the
debtor had purchased the farm on installment contract. The
farm homestead was worth several times what remained
owed on the debt. After the farm homestead was deeded
back to the parents, the debtor continued to live and farm on
the homestead without payment of rent. The debtor also
transferred livestock to the parents for consideration far
below the value of the livestock. During all of these
transfers, the former spouse held a judgment lien on the
property but did not receive any payment on the debt. The
former spouse sought to have the property settlement debt
declared nondischargeable under several theories. First, the
former spouse argued that the debt was nondischargeable
under Section 727(a)(5) because the debtor failed to
adequately explain the loss of assets. The court held that the
transfers occurred too long before the bankruptcy case to
apply Section 727. Second, the former spouse argued that
the debt was nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(4)
because of fraud or defalcation while acting as a fiduciary.
The court held that the debtor was not a fiduciary as to the
former spouse as to the property settlement. Third, the
former spouse argued that the debt was nondischargeable
under Section 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury to
the property of another. The court held that in transferring
the farm homestead and livestock for less than adequate
consideration while retaining the use of the property and
without compensating the former spouse for the security
interest lost in the transfers, the debtor willfully and
maliciously damaged the former spouse’s security interest
in the property with full knowledge that the transfers would
injure the former spouse’s rights in the property. The court
also held that the debt would be nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(15) because the debtor would have sufficient
income after the discharge of other bankruptcy debts to pay
the property settlement. In re Straub, 192 B.R. 522
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1996).
REOPENING CASE. The debtors had reached an
agreement with the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
in their Chapter 12 case for the deposit of the proceeds of
collateral in an account pending the debtors’ appeal of a
cash collateral decision. The appeals were decided in favor
of the CCC and the CCC obtained disbursement of the
proceeds. However, at the time of the disbursement, the
proceeds had grown because of accrued interest and the
entire amount was distributed to the CCC. The debtors did
not challenge the distribution and the case was eventually
closed. Three years after the distribution, the debtors sought
to reopen the bankruptcy case to challenge the distribution
of the interest to the CCC, claiming excusable neglect for
the late challenge. The court held that although a case could
be reopened for excusable neglect, the three year delay was
too long to allow reopening a case for excusable neglect. In
re Watford, 192 B.R. 276 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 and the
IRS and state of Illinois filed claims for employment taxes
not paid by the debtor. The debtor’s plan provided for full
payment of the tax claims and the plan was confirmed.
After the debtor paid the tax claims, the state filed a claim
for additional prepetition employment taxes and the IRS
filed a claim for additional FUTA taxes based on the
additional state claim. The debtor argued that the claims
were barred by the confirmation of the plan. The court held
that, because the tax claims were priority nondischargeable
claims, whether or not filed, the confirmation of the plan
did not affect the status of the claims and the claims were
allowed after confirmation of the plan. The court also held
that the governmental units were not estopped from
bringing the claims because the debtor failed to show any
misrepresentation by the government entities or any reliance
by the debtor on the filed claims. In re McConahey, 192
B.R. 187 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996).
The debtors filed for Chapter 11 and the IRS filed a
claims for secured, unsecured priority and general
unsecured tax claims. The debtors’ plan provided for full
payment of the claims over the six years of the plan with
interest from the date of confirmation. The IRS then sought
post-petition, preconfirmation interest on its claims. The
court held that, because the plan provided for full payment
of the tax claims, no post-petition, preconfirmation interest
was allowed. The court noted that such interest would be
allowed if the plan did not provide for full payment. In re
Heisson, 192 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and the IRS filed a claim
for taxes owed more than three years before the petition
date. The tax claim involved unreported income resulting
from the debtor’s embezzlement of funds. The taxes were
considered as taxes for which the debtor filed a fraudulent
return or willfully attempted to evade, under Section
523(a)(1)(C). The court held that, under the plain language
of Section 1328(a), the taxes were dischargeable in Chapter
13. In re Zieg, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,161
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13 case which
was dismissed. The debtor filed the current Chapter 13 case
and the IRS filed a claim for 1987 and 1988 taxes. The
debtor argued that the taxes were dischargeable because the
taxes were for years more than three years before the
current bankruptcy filing. The court held that the first
bankruptcy filing tolled the three year period in Section
507(a)(8)(A) during the first bankruptcy case. Because less
than three years passed after the taxes were due and the
filing of the second case, less the duration of the first
bankruptcy case, the taxes were dischargeable. In re
Taylor, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,181 (3d Cir.
1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
CCC has issued interim regulations, effective immediately,
which allow producers with CRP contracts which expire on
September 30, 1996 to terminate the contracts early. The
producers may then use the land for farming, haying or
grazing under approved conditions. If the land is highly
erodible, the land may be farmed if farmed under an
Alternative Conservation System as determined by the
NRCS. If the land is used for haying or grazing, the use
must be according to a plan determined by the NRCS. Land
not eligible for the early termination includes land with an
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erodibility index greater than 15, land within an average of
100 feet of a stream or other permanent water body, land
subject to a CRP easement and land containing grass
waterways, filter strips, shallow water areas for wildlife,
bottomland timber, field windbreaks and shelterbelts. Land
for which an early release has been granted will not be
eligible for reenrollment. 61 Fed. Reg. 10671 (March 15,
1996).
GRAIN HANDLING FACILITIES. The OSHA has
adopted as final regulations governing protection of
employees who enter flat storage structures for grain. 61
Fed. Reg. 9578 (March 8, 1996).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* See case summary p. 12 supra.
Conforti v. U.S., 74 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 1996), o n
rehearing, 69 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1995), aff'g and rev’g, 54
Agric. Dec. 649 (1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s estate
created a trust with the decedent’s daughter as income
beneficiary with a remainder to a charitable organization.
The trust originally provided for all net income to be paid to
the beneficiary and provided the trustee with the power to
amend the trust to insure that the trust qualified as a
charitable remainder unitrust. The trustee petitioned a state
court to amend the trust to provide annual payments to the
beneficiary expressed as a percent of the fair market value
of the trust’s assets. The IRS ruled that because the change
in the beneficiary’s interest was less than 5 percent of the
value of the trust assets, the amendment qualified the trust
as a charitable remainder unitrust. Ltr. Rul. 9613012, Dec.
26, 1995.
   GIFTS OF COMMODITY FUTURES CONTRACTS.
The taxpayer donated commodities futures contracts to a
private foundation. Because of I.R.C. § 1256, the taxpayer
could not donate the 40 percent portion of the contract
eligible for only short term capital gain or loss treatment;
therefore, the taxpayer treated only the 60 percent portion of
the contracts eligible for long term capital gain or loss
treatment as donated to the foundation. The IRS objected to
the charitable deduction for the 60 percent portion under
two theories: (1) the transfers were not eligible for the
deduction because the gifts represented only partial interests
in the contracts and (2) the marked-to-market rules of I.R.C.
§ 1256 required the taxpayers to recognize any income or
loss upon the transfer of the contracts to the foundation. The
trial court held that the transfers of 60 percent of the futures
contracts were not partial interests because the taxpayer
retained no interest in the transferred portion. The trial court
held that the imposition of the 60-40 limitations on capital
gain or loss treatment of futures contracts did not affect the
charitable deduction of transfers divided according to the
60-40 split. The trial court also held that the marked-to-
market rules did not apply to gift transfers. The appellate
court reversed on the last two issues, holding that I.R.C. §
1256 applied to recognize gain upon donation of the futures
contracts. Greene v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,180 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’g, 864 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. N.Y.
1994).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].  The
IRS has issued the 1996 list of average annual effective
interest rates charged on new loans by the Farm Credit
Bank system to be used in computing the value of real
property for special use valuation purposes:
   District    Interest rate  
Columbia 8.98
Omaha 8.38
Sacramento 9.28
St. Paul 8.73
Spokane 8.48
Springfield 8.59
Texas 8.86
Wichita 8.44
Rev. Rul. 96-23, I.R.B. 1996-__.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The
decedent had transferred the decedent’s residence, valued at
$1.3 million, to the decedent’s sons for a promissory note
for $337,000, with a retained life estate for the decedent.
The sons’ income from the family corporation was
insufficient to make the payments on the note until the
decedent forgave one year’s payment and increased the
sons’ compensation and bonuses from the corporation. The
decedent also transferred the note to the corporation. The
note was paid off by the time of the decedent’s death due to
large bonuses paid to the sons. The court held that the value
of the residence, less the amounts paid by the sons, was
included in the gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a) because
the consideration for the transfer was only 26 percent of the
full value of the property. Wheeler v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,226 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
VALUATION. The decedent’s estate consisted of 50
percent of the voting stock of a family owned corporation in
which the decedent’s heirs owned all of the nonvoting stock
and the other 50 percent of the voting stock. The estate was
allowed a 25 percent discount in the value of the decedent’s
stock for lack of marketability but the IRS denied a discount
of 10 percent for a minority interest. The court held that the
allowance of a lack of marketability discount did not
preclude allowance of a minority discount. Because a 50
percent interest in the voting stock was insufficient to
control corporate affairs, the decedent’s estate was allowed
a 10 percent discount for a minority interest. Wheeler v.
U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,226 (W.D. Tex.
1995).
The decedent owned unregistered voting stock in a
corporation in which the decedent was an affiliate under
federal securities law. The stock was subject to federal
security law restrictions on the sale of the stock during the
decedent’s life but the restrictions did not apply to the
decedent’s estate. The estate argued that the stock should be
valued for estate tax purposes with a discount for the
restrictions in effect during the decedent’s life. The court
ruled that the valuation was to be determined by reference
to the interest which passed by reason of the decedent’s
death; therefore, because the stock passed to the estate
without the restrictions, no discount for the restrictions
could be applied to the value of the stock. Estate of
McClatchy v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. No. 9 (1996).
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The decedent owned a 67 percent interest in a leasehold
in a parking garage. The executors valued the leasehold for
estate tax purposes based on a pending offer to purchase the
leasehold. The sale did not occur, however, and the
leasehold was sold to the decedent’s son for much less than
the estate tax value. The executors sought to amend the
estate tax return to decrease the value. The trial court
denied the lower value, holding that the executors failed to
rebut the IRS valuation of the leasehold at the value
originally claimed by the estate. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that the executors failed to show that the
trial court’s decision was erroneous.  Wrona v. U.S., 96-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,227 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayers used a home office
for their financial services activity and for managing two
residential rental properties. The taxpayers claimed
depreciation deductions for computer equipment used
exclusively for those business activities. The taxpayers did
not keep any records to substantiate the computer business
use. The taxpayers were allowed home office deductions
for the home office. The court held that the computer
equipment was not “listed property” under I.R.C. §
280F(d)(4)(B) requiring substantiation records because the
equipment was used at a regular business establishment
which included a home office. Zeidler v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-157.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayer had
claimed a NOL carryover from 1990 to 1991; however, the
taxpayer failed to timely file the 1990 tax return. The court
held that the taxpayer failed to timely file the waiver to
carryback NOL because the tax return was not timely filed.
The Tax Court had disallowed any carryback because the
taxpayer failed to substantiate the carryback to the three
years before 1990. The appellate court affirmed on the first
issue and reversed on the second issue, holding that the Tax
Court had not given the taxpayer sufficient opportunity to
demonstrate that the NOLs could not have been carried
back. Moretti v. Comm’r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,162 (2d Cir. 1996).
SOCIAL SECURITY. Congress has passed new limits
on the maximum amount of annual earnings before
reduction of benefits for persons who reach retirement age:
1997 $12,500 2001 $17,000
1998 $13,500 2002 $25,000
1999 $14,500 2003 $30,000
2000 $15,500
H.R. 3136.
NEGLIGENCE
AERIAL SPRAYING . The plaintiffs grew tomatoes
and jalapenos peppers which suffered damage from
exposure to herbicide. The plaintiffs sued in negligence the
defendants who had sprayed neighboring fields with
herbicide. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ presentation
of evidence to rebut the defendant’s testimony that the
defendant used reasonable care in spraying the neighboring
fields. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide
expert testimony as to the care used by the defendant in
applying the herbicide. The plaintiffs had provided expert
testimony as to the effect of the herbicide on the tomatoes
and jalapenos but the testimony did not cover the
reasonableness of the defendant’s care in applying the
herbicide. The court held that the trial court should have
entered a directed verdict for the defendant because the
plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the spraying was
not done with reasonable care. Hager v. Romines, 913
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Walthall v. Comm'r, 911 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Alaska
1995). (Partnership administrative adjustments) see p. 47
supra.
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